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How do we understand the relevant meaning of sentences used in ordinary contexts? This is a central problem in psychology and a primary preoccupation of the psycholinguist. One particularly difficult aspect of this problem is that we know very little about the role of contexts in language comprehension. A natural starting point for investigating this question is to limit the context, the sentence, and their relation in an experimental task.
Recently, this approach has been applied to sentence verification in tasks in which subjects are asked to judge whether a picture matches a sentence. The verification times are used to motivate "information processing" models that describe what subjects do as a stage-by-stage process. These models appear to be elegant paradigms for the study of comprehension. They contain both a representational and a processing component, and they utilize the apparent formalistic rigor of the information-processing approach. In the latest of these proposals, Carpenter and Just (197S) present a broad-ranging information-processing model that encompasses most of the previous models. In the present paper we examine several of these models, focusing on Carpenter and Just's interpretation in order to evaluate the actual and potential contribution of models of sentence-picture verification tasks to the study of comprehension.
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We demonstrate that the kind of representation modeled in sentence-picture verification experiments is conditioned by the verification task. The representational component of the models describes a verification representation that is itself derived from the more general representation needed for comprehension. The models do not specify the process by which the verification representation is derived; nor do the common set of assumptions claimed for the class of models provide a set of principles for understanding the structure or development of the verification representations. Finally, we consider several problems that may limit the value of these models for the analysis of cross-modal verification.
The Constituent Comparison Model
In the Carpenter and Just (1975) model, the picture and the sentence are first represented as embedded propositional structures. The prepositional encodings of the picture and the sentence are then compared from the inside out (i.e., beginning with the innermost embedded predicates). The subject is assumed to have a conceptual response index, which is initialized at TRUE. A mismatch between propositions changes the response index (e.g., from TRUE to FALSE) and reinitializes the comparison process. Each comparison of corresponding constituents (predicates in the picture and sentence representations) adds a constant increment of time. Thus, Carpenter and Just label their model the "constituent comparison model." The verification time for any particular sentence is determined by the value of a parameter k, which is an index of the number of .comparisons of constituents that have been made. The final value of the response index (TRUE or FALSE) determines the subject's response.
Flexible Representations
Carpenter and Just argue that the constituent comparison model is superior to previous models in that it uses only one parameter, k, to predict verification latencies. They further maintain that this single parameter can explain verification times obtained in a wide range of sentence-picture verification experiments. The value of k, however, is determined by the representation of the sentence and the picture.
1 Hence, the representations determine all of the model's predictions.
Consider (Carpenter & Just, 197S, p. 63) .
These variations may be unintentional minor discrepancies in presentation that have no consequences for the model. However, they are exemplary of intentional inconsistencies of representation. These latter inconsistencies are serious since the success of the model depends on them. For example, in Experiment 1, Carpenter and Just (197S) They eliminate the embedding affirmative for both predicate negatives and affirmatives on the ad hoc grounds "that the embedding clause It's true . . . does not change the truth value and so it can be ignored" (Carpenter & Just, 1975, p. SI) . The use of this "truth value" criterion to omit the embedding predicate AFF is introduced solely in the context of this experiment. Furthermore, their use of this criterion itself is inconsistent. They represent denials with AFF, but omit it for predicate negatives; yet they also point out that these two constructions always have the same truth value in the context of this experiment (197S, p. 51 Consider the results Carpenter and Just obtained for these three sentence types-affirmatives (A), predicate negatives (PN), and denials (D)-in a sentence-picture verification task. The latency ordering was TA < FA < FPN < TPN < FD < TD (T indicates that the sentence and picture matched; F that they mismatched). Carpenter and Just's model predicts this ordering since, using their representations, the corresponding respective values of k are k, k + 1, k + 2, k + 3, k + 4, and k + 5. This is an important result for Carpenter and Just because the earlier models do not naturally predict this ordering (see Carpenter & Just, 1975, pp. 52-53 , for a detailed discussion).
In Figure 1 , we have replotted their Experiment 1 data (Carpenter & Just, 1975, Figure 3 ) using representations that are consistent with those outlined above and using the number of comparisons predicted by their model. The representations selected by Carpenter and Just result in a linear function relating k and verification times. With fully consistent representations however, the fit between the data and the model is less compelling. It should be pointed out that the inconsistent use of embedding predicates is not restricted to Carpenter and Just's model. The CACTRAS model (so-called by Carpenter & Just, 1975 , after its original proponents Clark and Chase, 1972, and Trabasso, Rollins, and Shaughnessy, 1971 ) also depends on the inconsistent use of embedding predicates.
The CACTRAS model accounts for reaction times in tasks in which the subject verifies affirmative and negative sentences against pictures. When one of more than two pictures may be presented with the sentence (a point to which we will return later), then response latencies show the following pattern: TA < FA < FN < TN. As in the Carpenter and Just model, both the sentence and the picture are encoded as propositions. For example, a picture of a green ball and the sentence The ball is green would both be encoded as (GREEN, BALL). Negative sentences, however, are encoded as propositions embedded in negative predicates. Thus, The ball is not green would be encoded as [NEC (GREEN, BALL)].
Also, as in the Carpenter and Just model, there is an "inside-out" comparison of sentence and picture representations. Verification latency is predicted by (a) the number of constituents encoded in the sentence representation and (b) the number of changes made in the response index. For example, in the FA case, there is one constituent encoded and one response index change. In the FN case, there are two constituents encoded and one response index change. However, the reason there is one less comparison needed in FA is that affirmative sentences have no embedding predicate to encode. Thus, the asymmetry between the representations of affirmative and negative sentences, seemingly only a notational convenience, saves the model by allowing it to distinguish FA from FN (see Trabasso, 1972, p. 116) .
Receding and Task-Specific Representations
The second aspect of the Carpenter and Just model that increases the flexibility of its representations is that the model allows that subjects can shift to a "sentence receding strategy" but does not specify antecedently when or why subjects will invoke this strategy. In Experiment 2, Carpenter and Just found that the constituent comparison model could only account for the data from the first of seven trial blocks. Instead of viewing the last six trial blocks as a disconfirmation of the constituent comparison model, they assumed that subjects must have been using a different representation strategy, and they constructed a separate model to account for Trial Blocks 2-7. This model, labeled the "constituent receding model," is similar to the constituent comparison model with the exception that negatives are receded into affirmatives. Although this extends the model to a wider range of data, it also drastically increases the range of representations tolerated by Carpenter and Just's model. Furthermore, the motivation for deciding that receding had occurred was post hoc. For example, Carpenter and Just gave the following reason for invoking the receding model in Experiment 2:
In a series of pilot studies in which the sentence preceded the picture, true predicate negatives were verified faster than false predicate negatives after the subjects were practiced. This result was obtained for Blocks 2-7 of Experiment 2, indicating that subjects were spontaneously recoding predicate negatives after one block of trials. (1975, p. 64) The incorporation of recoding into the constituent comparison model schema allows the model to predict any ordering between TN and FN. Thus, in Trial Block 1, Carpenter and Just found that FN were faster than TN; in Trial Blocks 2-7, they found that TN were faster than FN; and, in accounting for data from Gough (196S; 1966, Experiment 1) in which TN were equal to FN, they suggested that recoding must have occurred approximately half of the time. They admit the possibility of additional unspecified recoding strategies and suggest that the representation adopted by the subject may include only selected aspects of the sentence (see Carpenter & Just, 1975, p. 65 Clearly, such recoding is only possible in very circumscribed and over-determined task environments. In the real world, it is clearly inadequate to assign if Judy had left and Judy didn't leave the same mental representation. This raises the general issue of task specificity.
Assuming that the representations given in the various models are correct, then a brief survey of the literature reveals that subjects' representations are greatly influenced by the information conditions of the verification task. In particular, the ways in which the picture can falsify the sentence influence the subject's representation of the sentence.
For example, we noted earlier that the ordering TA < FA < FN < TN obtains only when more than one picture may falsify each sentence. Young and Chase (Note 1) and Trabasso, Rollins, and Shaughnessy (1971) studied sentencepicture verification in tasks in which two types of affirmative and negative sentences (e.g., the ball is (not) red; the ball is (not) green) were paired with one of two pictures (e.g., a red or green ball). Under these conditions, TN were verified faster than FN. According to Young and Chase (Note 1) and Trabasso et al. (1971) , this FN-TN shift occurred because subjects were recoding all negative sentences into their affirmative counterparts (i.e., The ball is not red was recoded into
The ball is green). (Young and Chase explicitly instructed their subjects to use this recoding strategy.) Recoding negatives into affirmatives is reasonable only because The ball is not green in this context always implies that The ball is red; that is, there is only one way a sentence may be falsified.
Task-specific representations emerge even in experiments where a wider range of sentences and pictures are used. Glucksberg, Trabasso, and Wald (1973) studied the representation of active and passive sentences. They presented subjects with an active or passive "schematic sentence" (e.g., CAR HIT TRUCK) followed by a picture that either matched or mismatched the sequence. Glucksberg et al. (1973) found that subjects correctly responded "false" fastest when the verbs mismatched. Subjects were slower to respond "false" when the first noun in the sentence was not present in the picture and slowest when the second noun was not present. They also used both "reversible" and "nonreversible" passive and active sentences.
2 Glucksberg et al. found that for both active and passive constructions, nonreversible sentences were verified faster than reversible sentences. Verification times for reversible passives were slower than verification times for their active counterparts. There were no differences, however, in verification times for wowreversible passives and their active counterparts. Glucksberg et al. (1973) propose the following model to account for these findings. First, the sequence is encoded as a string containing the verb followed by the nouns in their surface order. Then, the verb and each noun (in order) are successively compared against each of the elements of the picture. If a match is not found for each of the elements, then the subject responds "false." If no lexical mismatch is detected, then the subject checks the semantic constraints on the nouns in relation to the verb. Glucksberg et al. (1973) propose that "+ orpotency features" are attached to each noun according to whether the noun can serve as the agent of the action described by the verb. If the potency features of the two nouns differ (i.e., if 2 In a reversible sentence, the subject and object can be interchanged and the sentence will still be semantically well-formed. Interchanging the subject and object of a nonreversible sentence results in a semantically anomalous sentence. Slobin (1966) found that reversible passives take longer to verify than their active counterparts. He found no difference between nonreversible passives and their active counterparts.
only one noun can be the agent), then the subject responds "true." This process is hypothesized both for nonreversible actives and passives, thus describing the absence of latency differences between them. If the potency features are the same (i.e., for reversible passives and actives in which either noun can be the agent), then the subject checks the nouns in order to determine which noun corresponds to the agent of the picture. This accounts for the fact that reversible sentences are responded to more slowly than nonreversible sentences.
For active reversible sentences, the first noun is the agent of the picture and the subject can respond "true." For passive reversible sentences, however, the first noun is not the agent of the picture, so both nouns need to be checked. This describes the fact that subjects take longer to decide that reversible passives are true than that reversible actives are true.
This model clearly differs from the two preceding ones in the representation assigned a sequence and in the verification operations posited. Again, there appears to be no a priori constraint on the operation of the model; processes (e.g., sensitivity to surface order) and formal representations (e.g., "potency features") are hypothesized as needed to "explain" the results. However, unlike the simpler examples, this model does deal with natural language properties such as word order and semantic constraints. Unfortunately, it breaks down when generalized beyond the limited situation it initially described.
For example, the model predicts that subjects respond "true" to the sentence The tree hit the boy followed by a picture of a boy hitting a tree. The sentence will be encoded as [HIT (TREE, BOY)] with a "+" potency feature attached to BOY and a "-" potency feature attached to TREE. Subjects will respond "true," since all lexical elements of the sentence are present in the picture and the potency features differ. But The tree hit the boy and a picture of a boy hitting a tree do not match.
As in the earlier cases, the problem with the extension of this model arises from the exclusion of a large class of sentences from the experiment. Whenever each element in the sentence corresponded to an element in the picture, the sentence and picture always matched. The sentence The tree hit the boy followed by a picture of a boy hitting a tree is one of a class of examples in which the "potency features" proposed by Glucksberg et al. (1973) predict the wrong agent of the sentence. If a wider variety of sentences had been included in the materials of the Glucksberg et al. study, subjects could only have stored representations consistent with the model at the risk of committing silly errors. Indeed, subjects would have required fuller representations including information about the grammatical relations of the nouns in the sentence, not merely their "potency" and surface order.
The preceding review has established two points: (a) The Carpenter and Just model and the CACTRAS model depend critically on minor variations in sentence representation that have no independent motivation; and (b) the representations that subjects adopt are task-specific, the most obvious task variable being the ways in which sentences can be false. The flexibility of representations reduces the number of data configurations that the models cannot account for and thus limits their interest as a consistent theory. Of course, there might be no consistent theory that subjects use in these tasks-that is, they may be correspondingly flexible in the representations they employ. At best, this reduces the models to theoretically post hoc descriptions of what subjects do. Furthermore, such descriptions themselves have little value for construction of a comprehension model because they are specific to each task. In many conversations, listeners must have available a representation for the sentence that is appropriate to an arbitrarily large range of contexts. The extreme case of this is one in which a sentence is uttered "out of context." Such sentences are reliably comprehended.
It might be argued that this view of conversational context is unduly pessimistic. Assume that we are wrong and that the context of an utterance does limit the ways in which it is to be understood to a degree sufficient for one of the information-processing models. How then does the listener decide which model is appropriate for processing each particular sentence? Since even the simple models depend on conflicting claims about the representation of the sentence, the listener would have to decide which model to use before assigning a representation. Short of conversational clairvoyance, the only way out of this dilemma is to assume that the context enables a contextually appropriate representation to be developed for a sentence after the sentence has been understood. Thus, normal sentence comprehension must be prior to the first stage of these models.
This raises the question: What is the representational component modeling? The small set of sentences presented and the particular verification task comprise a circumscribed task environment. Under these conditions, subjects may construct special representations that are maximally efficient for these verification tasks. This leads to the following analysis of what subjects might be doing. First, they "understand" the sentence, developing a representation for it. Then, they extract a verification representation from the comprehension representation. The form of the verification representation depends on the particular verification task. Presumably the same preprocessing is required for the picture-that is, subjects must "perceive" the picture before developing an appropriate verification representation of it. Of course, after a large number of trials with a limited number of sentences and pictures, subjects may begin to encode the sentences and pictures immediately in terms of verification representations.
If subjects can develop special-purpose representations, then these tasks offer an opportunity to study how general-purpose mental representations are replaced by special-purpose structures in particular circumstances. There are several reasons why sentence-picture verification would seem to be an ideal paradigm for such an investigation. First, the task constrains the subject's representation of the sentence and the comparison strategy. Second, the parameters of these tasks can be explicitly specified.
However, none of the investigators we have discussed indicate a primary interest in the relation of task strategies and other knowledge. This is reflected in the fact that the large number of practice trials characteristic of the actual experiments are almost never analyzed, even though it is those trials that would provide invaluable data on the development of task strategies. (For example, Carpenter and Just, 1975, p. 62 , refer to "pilot data," which they do not present, to motivate applying the receding model instead of the constituent comparison model to Blocks 2-7 of Experiment 2.)
Shared Principles of Sentence-Picture Verification Models
Even in the absence of a detailed study of the development of verification representations for any individual experiment, the general principles of the models might shed light on the structure and development of derived representations in general. Consistent with this view, several investigators have suggested that it is not the details of the specific models that are at issue but the general structure that characterizes the models as a class (Carpenter & Just, 197S; Clark, 1974; Just, 1974) . Carpenter and Just (197S) list five invariant features in their model of sentence verification: (a) the "find and comparison operation" (constituent by constituent comparisons appear to be common); (b) the comparison operations seem to be performed serially since the latencies increase with the number of comparison operations that are performed; (c) the processing rate for each operation usually lies between 100 and 300 msec, except for highly practiced subjects; 3 (d) the order in which the constituents are compared reflects the linguistic structure of the sentence and the information structure of the task; and (e) the general nature of the control structure remains similar although not identical. In particular, the constituents of two propositional representations are compared with the outcome determining the subsequent flow of control.
It should be noted at the outset that none of these invariant features describes a characteristic of the representation of either the sentence or the picture. This reflects Carpenter and Just's lack of constraints in selecting the representations, which in turn weakens the force of the "invariant features" that they do propose. Features (a) and (b) are invariant only because either the constituent comparison or receding models can be applied to all tasks that Carpenter and Just consider. However, as we have seen, this is due to the flexibility with which they determine the representations of sentences. Feature (b) is questionable in light of our application of consistent representations to Carpenter and Just's data for Experiment 1. The import of feature (c) is unclear since the number of mental operations predicted by the model is conditioned by the representation of the sentence and the picture. Furthermore, many mental operations take place within 100 and 300 msec. Feature (d) is only partially true: It is not clear that the linguistic structure of the sentence is reflected in its verification representation in any interesting way (see below). Clark (1974) and Just (1974) have also proposed general principles based on sentence-picture 3 It is interesting to note that the authors do not explain a systematic difference in the time per comparison for each operation when full sentences are used: Tasks with the picture presented first result in a longer mean time per comparison (278 msec) than tasks with the sentence presented first (179 msec). The median for the 16 experiments using full sentences summarized by Carpenter and Just (1975) in their Table 4 , is 187 msec. (We exclude Trabasso et al., 1971 , because they employed schematic sentences with nonsense syllables.) Three of the 10 sentencefirst experiments have a time per comparison greater than the median, while 5 of the 6 picture-first experiments have a time per comparison greater than the median. (This property of the model? was called to our attention by Richard Sanders.) matching experiments. Just (1974) maintains that although each of the information-processing models may have idiosyncratic properties, they all share a common set of assumptions. Just (1974) lists the following three assumptions as being common to all information-processing models of sentence-picture matching: (a) The picture and the sentence are encoded as propositions; (b) the propositions are hierarchically structured; and (c) the sentence and picture are compared using a comparison process that operates from the "inside out" (beginning with the most embedded proposition).
These principles are quite general. For example, with regard to Just's first and second propositions, we know of no situation that cannot be described using embedded prepositional structures. The universality of his third proposition depends on the inconsistency of representations that we have discussed. Clark (1974) argues that two central claims are borne out by these models and experiments: the principle of "congruence" and the "deep structure assumption." The principle of congruence asserts that two mental representations must be brought into structural congruence before they can be compared (e.g., verifying sentences and pictures). Clark's second generalization, the deep structure assumption, claims that sentences are mentally encoded into a form that is consistent with their linguistic deep structure representations. The deep structure assumption restricts Just's first principle enough to make it a testable claim.
Unfortunately, the deep structure hypothesis is clearly inconsistent with research in information-processing models of sentence-picture matching tasks. The surface structure representation of both the Glucksberg et al. (1973) model and Carpenter and Just's constituent receding model contradicts Clark's deep structure hypothesis. In fact, Carpenter and Just argue that the representations subjects use in verification tasks are "neither linguistic nor pictorial in nature but can represent information from either domain" (1975, p. 47) . They specifically distinguish "the psychological notion of an internal representation" from "the traditional linguistic notion of deep structure" (1975, p. 48) . They have used the verification paradigm to study the contrast between such negative/positive pairs as forget/remember, but at the same time they report no differences for such recognized linguistically marked/unmarked pairs as small/large (1975, p. 68) .
The problems with the deep structure hypothesis are further compounded since Clark (1974) has also argued that certain adjective pairs, including above and below, differ in behavioral complexity for perceptual and psychophysical reasons. Part of the import of Clark's discussion is that even if data in sentence-picture matching tasks are consistent with linguistic deep structure differences, the interpretation of the data is ambiguous between a linguistic and a nonlinguistic (e.g., perceptual) explanation. Given this, and the obscure relationship between the representations subjects adopt for verification tasks and linguistic deep structure representations, we cannot make conclusions about linguistic structure based on verification latencies in sentence-picture matching tasks.
In fact, these experiments may best be viewed as a first exploration of verification processes, the processes by which we monitor the contextual appropriateness of already understood sentences. Carpenter and Just (1975) imply this position by the subtitle of their paper ("A Psycholinguistic Processing Model of Verification"), although they also imply that verification is so integral a component of sentence "comprehension" (as stated in their title) that studying one is tantamount to studying the other.
Clark's congruency principle and Just's "insideout" comparison principle are claims specifically about how sentences and pictures are compared for purposes of verification. Clark's principle holds that the sentence and picture must receive structurally congruent representations before they can be compared; Just details the comparison procedure and specifies the form of the representations to be compared.
The assumption underlying this view of verification, made explicit by Clark and Chase (1972) and in Just's "inside-out" comparison principle, is that sentences and pictures can be compared only if there is a common "language" in which they can be compared. While this assumption is reasonable, the existence of intermodal mapping does not require a common language (see Bever, 1975) . For example, a typewriter reliably transforms finger movements into printed letters. There is no common language to which finger movements and letters can be reduced: Nevertheless, we could construct situations in which a typewriter could be used to verify that particular finger movements had occurred. 4 Analogously, there may be a psychological system that maps linguistic meanings into visual configurations and vice-versa without the existence of a common representational language. * This analogy was suggested to us by Michael Friedman.
The success of sentence-picture verification models would seem to provide strong support for the common language assumption. However, as we have seen, the "success" of these models depends considerably on extremely flexible criteria for selecting representations. Until these criteria are made less arbitrary, sentence-picture verification experiments can shed little light on the validity of either the common language assumption or the hypotheses about verification that are predicated on it.
In summary, we have suggested that the nature of both the subject's representations (of the sentence, and the picture) and his comparison strategy is task-specific. The Carpenter and Just model presupposes comprehension of the sentence and perception of the picture. The subject extracts verification representations for the already perceived picture and the already understood sentence that are appropriate for the verification tasks. The representation and matching strategy adopted by the subject depends critically on the number and type of ways in which the picture and the sentence can mismatch. The Carpenter and Just model (and previous models) suffers from theoretical arbitrariness in the choice of representation form, although that choice determines the predicted results. Finally, the common set of assumptions emerging from these models is inadequate as a basis for either a theory of comprehension or verification. Thus, at best, such studies may provide specific examples of how subjects can verify sentences they have already understood against pictures they have already encoded. 
